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Air France Lost Baggage – How Airbus SideStick Design Led To The Crash Of Air France Flight #447.

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Did Airbus rely too much on automation? Many think so and think it was automation that brought down Air France Flight #447.

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  1. It's always terrified me that each pilot is unable to see or feel what the other pilot does. Then there's the fact that you have to go from right hand to left hand when you step up to Captain ffs. Then there's the 50-50 averaging with woefully little warning. Bonin just did what Airbus implicitly teaches pilots to do in the plane that creating the "pay to fly" concept – tug back on the 'up' button and hope the avionics save you. Absolutely terrifying design, and I've NEVER understood how planes can be certified when they literally HIDE each pilots' inputs from each other. Madness.

  2. I refuse to fly on fully automated airliners (essentially unmaned Drones) with inexperienced non-proficient pilots (because they don't hand fly airplanes today. The computer flys the airplane).
    So-called 'flying hours' monitoring flight computers is NOT hands-on flying experience.
    NTSB accident reports confirms my assertion.
    I stopped using commercial air travel entirely, when I retired from the USAF after the Gulf War. I don't trust total reliance on computers for obvious reasons.

  3. Maximus: "May be if you can prove the pilot is the weakest link in the aviation safety chain …". As matter of fact, we know this.

    This was demonstrated in a very similar situation earlier in 2022 onboard AF11 (yes, Air France again) on a Boeing 777-300. The Boeing has the yoke controls that Sully, in my opinion wrongly overpraised. On final, during a go-around, in a very stressful situation, one pilot pulled up, while the other pushed down. Even the controls are connected, neither of the pilots recognized what the other pilot was doing. This firstly speaks very strongly against the argument Sully is making that the connected yokes on the Boeing make it easier to understand what the other pilot is doing. Most importantly, this demonstrates that pilots are indeed the weakest link – as in very stressful situation, they will have tunnel vision and ignore any outside clues, no matter if this is a blinking light on the cockpit panel, an oral warning or a yoke that is physically fighting you back. This is just a limitation in humans.

    BTW: AF11 were lucky and did not crash, but the accident was reported as loss of control and categorized as severe occurrence.

  4. Studying aerospace engineering it’s clear that most mistakes happen due to stress which is the case here, the automation in airbus helps alleviate stress for pilots. While it is true that some pilots do become complacent in flying planes as a result and rely too much on the systems in place I think it’s unfair to blame the systems which help pilots for pilots using them as an excuse to lower their standards, most competent pilots would have realised their situation much sooner or even avoided it

  5. Nope .. people still make better decisions than machines. The last flight for piloted planes would also be my last flight. I am all for electronic and pilots working together. It has already made aviation the safest means of travel for decades. Why fix what is not broken?

  6. The pitot tube issue that Airbus was having was not addressed quickly enough. This contributed to the fact that the two joysticks are not electronically slave to each other. So when the co-pilot locked up mentally with the stick all the way back no one could see what he was doing, that is until the captain actually looked at his hand on the side controller and was screaming what are you doing. I think this is a major safety flaw in the design of the aircraft.

  7. The fact of the matter is that it has happened on a Boeing – at least twice. In the case of Birgenair 301 which you covered recently (a B757), the Captain was pulling up into the stall, with one of the FOs calling out "ADI" throughout the descent, the other FO having the connected yoke in his lap, and yet the FO was not able to put it together and take control from the Captain before the aircraft crashed. The other accident occured in 1974 to Northwest Orient flight 6231, a positioning flight being flown by a B727 – in very similar circumstances to AF447, the pitot probes iced over and the crew misdiagnosed the stick shaker (indicating a stall) as mach buffet (indicating overspeed), just as FO Bonin did on AF447. Again, the pilot flying pulled up into the stall and the pilot monitoring, despite having the connected yoke practically in his lap, was unable to diagnose the problem before the aircraft crashed near Stony Point, NY.

  8. This story reminds me of the James Bond verbal exchange to verify identity when he meets another unknown friendly agent in ‘From Russia With Love.’ Agent 1 says: “May I borrow a match?” Agent 2: “I use a lighter.” Agent 1: “better still.” Agent 2: “Until they go wrong.”

    Conclusion – the technology is great until it goes wrong. So wise smokers in those days always carried a book of matches in case the lighter failed. But make sure those matches stay dry.

    Parallel- the technology is great but keep 2 pilots in you pocket for when the technology fails (and it will). Oh, and make sure they are properly trained and not worthless wet matches!

  9. Since you have now finally done a story acknowledging an Airbus design flaw, why don’t you do one on the Air Inter A320s that had 2 incidents a month apart (kinda like the Max) where the rate of descent knob as designed confused crews who thought they were in a % rate of descent instead of actual rate in feet per minute. The flaw was as bad as MCAS but less people died only due to good fortune.

    Or do a story about the several A320s that hit the ground hard and crashed due to the override system you spoke of in this story that ignores some pilot inputs it assumes are pilot error by suddenly pulling up (when they weren’t wrong).

    Or do a story about the various A320s that crashed off the ends of runways when automatic thrust reversers didn’t deploy and the pilots couldn’t manually override them – just to name a few.

    If you do about half a dozen of these kinds of stories on Airbus – and there’s plenty of incidents to choose from – your credibility with me may start to improve (provided your anti-Boeing agenda becomes less obvious).

    Go ahead – do you want an audience of only Boeing haters like you or do you want to be a real objective aviation reporter? Your choice – there are plenty of other places where we can get objective reporting (and do).

  10. Two things.
    1. I agree totally that if you move a stick, yoke, side stick force sensor, wiji board, whatever, then it should be reflected on both sides of the cockpit. After all, that is exactly the situation when you learn to fly in your C152, and every a/c up until you train on the Airbus systems. In effect you have, suddenly, to un-learn a bunch of feedback information and look for a small indicator light that tells you who is actually in command. Sure you can have procedures, calls, checklists, training, but nothing substitutes for direct feedback in a situation of sensory overload and alarms, contradictory information (too fast, too slow!) and systems confused by their faulty inputs leading to a plethora of hi tech crap (voice commands, sounds, flashing and changing screens) being thrown at you demanding contradictory responses and interfering with your ability to digest a complex situation. 

    Yes, the design idea is great but does not integrate the most important flight management law of all. 

    Murphy's law… "whatever can possibly go wrong will do so, and at the most inconvenient time, and with the greatest consequences."

    Unfortunately Airbus, an extraordinary engineering company, has not quite grasped this. In Australia this is folklore, derived from living in a remote and hostile environment that is capable of ruining your day at a moments notice. That is why, when QF 7 suffered a massive engine catastrophe, and was confronted with a situation that was not in the manual, that was not part of the training, that was not pre-programmed into either the "flight system laws" or the training of the Pilots flying that, in fact, the rules were thrown out and a return to the basics occurred. AVIATE, NAVIGATE, COMMUNICATE. True… there was an enormous amount of experience on board, by coincidence. But that came into play after the initial management and diagnosis occurred. "Capt… 'ok stop telling what's broken, tell me what works!"… after 240 odd ECAM messages, with attendant alarms…. Then followed by, (un-documented in the actions list), manual flight control handling tests to see what was possible… After that?… A ridiculously high speed approach at way over max landing weight, 12 tons heavier in one wing than the other, a completely un-documented and un-calculable aft CofG (did you know the A380 stored fuel in the tail?), no auto brake, half the spoilers, and no reverse thrust. Calcs "suggested" that they might stop before the end of the runway if the pilot managed to get it on the ground with about a 100 meter margin for error touch down point, and a maybe 2 knot margin for speed between stall, with loss of control, and over shoot. You know the outcome. No one hurt, big sigh of relief.

    Same thing with QF 70. (A330) Totally normal flight at cruise in clear CAVOK until a/c decided that it was stalling and over-speeding at the same time and pitched violently down. Minus 1.5 G… Passengers, crew, anything loose slammed into the ceiling, Several long seconds where the flight crew were unable to get any response at all from control inputs then suddenly pitch up command response and of course a 1.5 G recovery which brought everything loose including unrestrained pax rapidly back to the floor. After relying on the ECAM messages and restoring the a/c to "normal" auto pilot ops,… the a/c did it again… This time the crew disconected as much of the automatic "safety" control laws as possible, declared an emergency and flew to a remote airforce base in northern AU. (In AU remote means remote, 1000+ NM from major airport/city.) Result was no fatalities, but many injuries, including serious ones with lifelong concequences. 

    (btw, if you happen to fly Qantas at some stage, you may find the Capt's cheery chat punctuated by a serious suggestion to keep your belt fastened when seated, no matter how smooth the air. This is why….)

    So what's the story here? Well… if it can go wrong, despite the best intentions of every designer, engineer, programmer, it one day will, and at the most inconvenient time. It's at that point that the Pilot Mk 1.1 will either earn his/her stripes, or not. So it is really a good idea that those pilots are more than just "systems operators", and instead, are capable and HAVE EXPERIENCED some "out of the expected" events that can occur in the 3D world of aviation. No, they don't have to go out and spin an A350 as training… But if they haven't spun a 152, 172, or equivalent, felt the world drop out from under their pants, rotating in the opposite direction to every control input they make, then they haven't learnt to fly.
    Personally I would stipulate a basic simple aerobatics endorsement as a requirement for a commercial pilots licence… Why? Because it focuses you on the basics. Airspeed. Attitude, then altitude. Our French crew on AF 447 had all of that information right in front of them. They had a lot of rubbish and distraction as well. But, in the absence of consistent, reliable data, particularly airspeed, which we are told to focus on blindly, (mostly for good reason) then there are other simple principles. If the power is set to X and I'm flying at an alt of about Y then my attitude should be Z degrees… roughly, to maintain roughly level flight. Super basic stuff… It applies from a Cessna to the Concorde…. We don't teach that stuff to Pilots, and instead let computers do that for us. Its a remarkable fact that the Air data system in AF 447 was effectively trying to do that mental arithmetic, but with faulty info, frozen pitot tubes. Computers… Garbage in… Garbage out. (BTW lets not even touch on the 737Max where greed completely over rode any sense of redundancy in data input and Pilots were deliberately left in the dark about the very existence of this "smart arse safety " software. Hell!, the Boeing test pilot crashed the simulator many times in response to in-appropriate actions of MCAS systems, and he knew about it!! Seriously? So this is not about Airbus vs Boeing, US vs Europe, all that noise. It is about ensuring that when Murphy's law suddenly enters your calm and self assured life, that your EXPERIENCE, way beyond training and manuals, AND the design of the a/c and its most basic interface, THE CONTROLS, give you as much familiar tactile information as possible, that you might be able to recognise what is going on, FLY the a/c, then deal with the systems, data, alarms, warnings, modes, lists, etc. ITS a PLANE!…Fly IT! If you don't then the rest of the tech systems etc won't matter for long…no matter who made them.
    The Dr.  

    (When I learnt to fly there was no GPS. Where I learnt to fly there were few nav aids. Dead reckoning was SOP. Still had to make your ETA reporting points within 2mins, on HF, no radar, even on an 800nm flight over desert… nothing. 1:1,000,000 WAC charts and a grease pencil. Good discipline, and fun!

  11. Is there any advantage of the side-stick system compared with a conventional yoke? I'm sure it is cheaper to install and maintain but that might not be a good trade-off. The "linked side-stick" system of Gulfstream doesn't offer all the advantages of a yoke based on what the video said. If nothing else, the yoke provides a convenient place to mount a tablet of supplmental instructment panel. Based on my limited time piloting a plane, taking one hand off of the yoke to do something else does not normally pose any undue risks.

  12. Firstly I suspect that Sully's words were edited out of context, probably deliberately so. Consider this, what aircraft was Sully flying when he ditched in the Hudson? The position of the controls on an Airbus is visible to both pilots, there is an indicator on the panel. Accidents such as this are seldom the fault of the aircraft, they are almost inevitably the result of pilot error and lack of training is a major factor in this. (The Boeing 737 Max accidents are an exception, even then, it was not so much the aircraft but Boeing hiding from pilots certain aspects of the control system) Lastly I do wish that people with minimal knowledge of flying and aerodynamics would refrain from making unsupported and incorrect conclusions just for effect and the promotion of a sensational video.

  13. Maximus – the report on page 174 states:

    "It would also seem unlikely that the PNF could have determined the PF’s flight path stabilisation targets. It is worth noting that the inputs applied to a sidestick by one pilot cannot be observed easily by the other one…"

    Not explicitly stated as a contributing factor, but why mention it in the report if it was not significant to the crash?

  14. Maximus you are wrong , it was not the airbus sidestick design that led to the crash , it was pilot error , the first officer failed to see that he was in a stall and kept pulling the nose of the plane up. its simply physics going up a hill will always slow you down . All the pilot had to do was to look at his instruments and fly the plane. One thing I know for sure is you always fly with the instruments in the dark , don't ever use visual references cause you make get disoriented.

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